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Abstract
Much experimental eort has been expended in attempts to establish the relative
superiority of Expected Utility theory and the many recently-developed alternatives
as descriptions of the behaviour of subjects in risky choice decision problems. The
cumulative evidence shows clearly that there is a great deal of noise in the experimen-
tal data, which makes it dicult to identify the `best' description of such behaviour.
This paper reports on an experiment which seeks to determine whether such noise is
relatively transitory and decays with experience and repetition, and thus whether a
clearly `best' theory emerges as a result of such repetition. We nd that for some sub-
jects this does indeed appear to be the case, while for other subjects the noise remains
high and the identication of the underlying preference function remains dicult.
1 Introduction
Early experimental work suggesting the inadequacy of Expected Utility theory as a de-
scription of behaviour under risk has stimulated, over the past decade, a large number
of alternative theories of such behaviour. This, in turn, has stimulated new experimental
activity investigating the relative superiority of these new theories. Interestingly, no clear
concensus has emerged. One main reason for this is that the experimental evidence clearly
indicates that there is a large amount of noise in subjects' behaviour in such experiments -
which makes accurate testing and estimation dicult. The existence of the noise is itself in-
teresting as most of the contending theories have deterministic predictions. This necessarily
suggests that none of the theories is empirically valid, at least insofar as the existing em-
pirical evidence is concered. A crucial point, therefore, is whether the empirically-observed

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noise is a permanent feature of subjects' behaviour - and thus `ought' to be integrated some-
how into the theories - or whether the noise is simply a consequence of the experimental
design. In particular, it has been argued that the noise is a consequence of the fact that
most experiments involve inexperienced subjects in unfamiliar situations tackling a one-o
decision problem. Consequently it may be the case that the noise is transitory and will
disappear in an experiment in which subjects have the opportunity to learn and understand
the nature of the problem. If so, it might be expected that the noise will tend to disap-
pear with experience, thus facilitating the better identication of the 'best' description of
the underlying true preference function. This paper reports on an experiment designed to
explore this line of reasoning.
2 The Experiments
We wanted to give the subjects plenty of opportunity to experience the decision task, so
we recruited a set of subjects who would repeat the experiment a total of 5 times. In
the past subjects have usually been exposed to the experiment on just the one occasion,
though there have been a number of experiments in which some element of repetion has
been involved, either within one experimental session (the same questions repeated within
the one experimental setting) or in two (but not to our knowledge more) experimental
settings; indeed, we used this technique ourselves earlier (Hey and Orme, 1994) with the
same questions (though in a randomised order and presentation) on two separate sessions,
separated by a period of several days. In the experiments reported in this paper, we repeated
the same set of questions in a total of ve sessions. As before, we randomised the order in
which the questions appeared (so that each subject in each session receieved the questions
in a dierent order).
The experiment was computerised, with subjects arriving individually at pre-booked
times. For all subjects, the ve sessions were separated by at least two days, to give them
time to reect on the experiment and on the way that they were responding to it. The
experiment was computerised and the subjects performed the experiment individually at
individual computer terminals in the EXEC laboratory.
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On each occasion the subjects were presented with 100 pairwise risky-choice questions,
portrayed on the computer screen in the form of segmented circles. They were asked to
indicated which of the pair they preferred
1
. To avoid misperception of probabilities, all
the questions involved probabilities that were multiples of one-eighth, and the subjects
were informed of this. This circles form of presentation is one that we have used several
times before and we feel that subjects have no diculty in understanding the probabilistic
implications (though we were careful to avoid the use of the word 'probability' in the
instructions
2
. The subjects were informed that, after the completion of all ve experimental
sessions, one of the 500 questions (100 on each of the 5 sessions) would be chosen at random
and their choice would be played out (using a (circular) `roulette wheel') and they would
be paid accordingly. This `random lottery incentive mechanism' is one that is frequently
used in such experiments. If subjects examine each pairwise choice question independently
of the others (which implies an assumption of separability) then this payment mechanism
gives them the appropriate incentive to reveal their true preferences on each question. Of
course, it could be argued that subjects consider the experiment as a single decision problem
- that of choosing a complete set of 500 answers to the 500 questions - and choose that
set of answers which is optimal for them given their preference functional. This is the
argument of (Karni and Safra, 1987) and of (Holt, 1986). If subjects did this there is no
obvious reason why they should give the same answers to the same question, but it requires
a level of sophistication that seems far beyond what subjects might be capable of. Indeed
it requires them knowing in advance all the 500 questions (which they could not) and then
considering all 2
500
possible sets of answers and then choosing that one that was optimal
for them. This seems far beyond the computational powers of any human subject - even
1
In these experiments, in contrast to earlier experiments we have conducted, we did not give the subjects
the opportunity to indicate indierence. This does not aect the value of the experiment to the subjects,
since if they are truly indierent it does not matter how they respond, given the incentive mechanism
(described below), but it simplies our subsequent data analysis: if subjects are given the opportunity to
express indierence, and take advantage of this opportunity, it is not obvious how one should treat such
responses - given the nature of the stochastic structure we assume, the chance of them being exactly indif-
ferent is zero, which implies a log-likelihood of minus innity, which in turn makes subsequent estimation
dicult.
2
We appreciate that other experimentalists use other methods for presenting risky choices and we would
not argue that ours is the best. Indeed, for certain types of experimental investigations, particularly those
relating to Regret theory, our presentation might well not be appropriate. But in the context of this
experimental investigation, we feel that the circles method is perhaps the simplest and most appropriate,
particularly when considered in conjunction with our payment mechanism (see below).
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assuming that they knew all 500 questions. Like other experimentalists, we shall ignore
this possibility, citing the work of (Cubitt et al., 1998) which indicates that the Random
Lottery Incentive mechanism does indeed work as we require it to work.
The 100 questions in each of the ve experimental sessions were the same 100 questions,
though the order was randomised, and the left/right positioning of the circles was also
randomised. The 100 questions were composed of four dierent sets, each consisting of 25
questions. Over all 100 questions the possible outcomes in the questions were -$25, $25,
$75 and $125, these amounts being chosen to make the incentive oered by the experiment
appropriate given the length of time necessary to complete it. The 4 sets of questions each
involved just three of these four possible outcomes: the rst set restricted to $25, $75 and
$125; the second set to -$25, $75 and $125; the third set to -$25, $25 and $125; and
the fourth set to -$25, $25 and $75. Accordingly, each pairwise choice question involved
a choice between two gambles which between them involved at most three outcomes. Note
that one of these four outcomes (-$25) involved a monetary loss. We felt that this would
increase the incentive power of the experiment. At the same time, given that we did not
want any subject to experience a real monetary loss, we gave all subjects a participation
fee of $25 for participating in all 5 sessions of the experiment. This meant that the real
monetary earnings of each subject would be one of the four possible amounts of money: $0,
$50, $100 and $150. This implied that our preference functionals were eectively tted
(in payo space) at the four values $W-25, $W+25, $W+75 and $W+125 where $W was
the wealth of the subject at the time of participating in the experiment. Clearly W could
vary during the course of the experiment, but we could regard the appropriate value as
the value of the subjects' wealth at the nal (fth) session of the experiment - when they
received the payo. They knew in advance when this would be. The set of questions is
given in Table 1.
We should briey comment on the choice of these questions. In doing so, it will be useful
to refer to the expository device now known as the Marschak-Machina Triangle, which allows
the representation of choice over risky choices involving at most three outcomes (as in our
experiment). If we denote the three outcomes by x
1
, x
2
and x
3
and if we label these so that
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x1
is the least preferred outcome and x
3
the most preferred, then any risky choice involving
these three outcomes can be represented by two numbers: p
1
and p
3
, the probabilities
respectively of the worst and best outcomes. (p
2
is, of course, given by 1   p
1
  p
3
.) We
put p
1
on the horizontal axis and p
3
on the vertical. The set of all possible risky choices
involving the three outcomes x
1
, x
2
and x
3
is represented by the triangle with vertices at
the origin, at (0,1) and at (1,0). Now envisage a rectangular grid imposed over this triangle,
with a grid dierence of 1/8. This denes a set of 45 points, each representing a risky choice
with probabilities multiples of 1/8. Any pair of such points represents a pairwise choice
problem. If the pair is such that one point is above and/or to the left of the other then
the rst of these dominates the second in the sense of rst degree stochastic dominance:
as such all subjects should prefer the risky choice above and/or to the left - whatever the
form of their preference functional (over risky choices). It might be argued that including
such pairs is not necessary in the sense that their inclusion does not allow discrimination
between the various competing preference functionals: if a subject chooses the dominating
choice then this behaviour is consistent with all preference functionals; if a subject chooses
the dominated choice then this behaviour is inconsistent with all preference functionals.
Indeed, many experiments have deliberately excluded such pairs. However, six (out of the
100) of the pairwise choice questions used in this experiment were of this form. We wanted
to test whether behaviour violated dominance. The six questions are questions 24, 25, 49,
50, 75 and 100 in Table 1. In the past, experimentalists have usually observed that subjects'
behaviour does not violate dominance when that dominance is `obvious'. We wanted to see
whether that was also true in our experiment. We shall comment on this later.
The remaining questions all were such that one of the two points lay strictly above and
to the right of the other: thus whether a subject prefers one or the other depends upon his
or her preference function. More particularly, a subject's preference in a particular pairwise
choice question depends upon his or her local (see (Machina, 1982)) risk aversion at that
point in the triangle. Given any pairwise choice, the more risk averse the subject the more
likely it is that he or she prefers the (relatively) safer of the two risky choices - namely
that below and to the left of the other. Now, as is well-known, in the Marschak-Machina
5
triangle (where the outcomes, x
1
, x
2
and x
3
, are xed) risk-aversion, for a subject with the
Expected Utility preference functional, is constant, so preference between any two choices
in a pairwise choice problem for such a subject should depend solely on that subject's level
of risk-aversion and the slope of the line joining the two points in the triangle. Crucially,
the position of the two points should be irrelevant: for an Expected Utility maximiser just
the slope of the line joining the two points is relevant.
Another way of putting the same point is to note that the indierence curves of an
individual in the Triangle depend upon the preference functional. For an Expected Utility
maximiser we have the important result that the indierence curves are parallel straight
lines - with a (constant) slope that depends upon the individual's attitude to risk. For other
preference functionals, risk-aversion varies across the triangle, so the slope of the indier-
ence curves vary across the Triangle. Dierent preference functionals are distinguished by
the precise way that the slope varies across the Triangle - for example, Weighted Expected
Utility theory implies that the slope decreases as one moves down and to the right - and
this is the way that we can empirically distinguish between the dierent preference func-
tionals. Clearly it is therefore important to be able to estimate the slope of an individual's
indierence curves at as many points in the Triangle as possible.
Unfortunately, pairwise choice questions do not yield a direct estimate of the slope of
the indierence curve - all they yield is upper or lower bounds on the slope. For example,
suppose the slope of the line joining the two points in a pairwise choice question in s, and
suppose that the subject says that he or she prefers the risky choice above and to the right.
Then, assuming for the moment that there is no error in the subject's reported preferences,
this observation enables us to conclude that the (average) slope of the individual's indif-
ference curve in the region of the two points dening the pairwise choice is less than s.
Contrariwise, if the subject reported a preference for the risky choice below and to the left,
what we can conclude is the (average) slope is more than s. In other words, pairwise choice
data is not particularly informative.
This might suggest that we should have looked for more informative data. For example,
if we know that a subject is exactly indierent between two choices, then (again ignoring
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any error) we would have a precise estimate of the slope of the individual's indierence
curve in that region - namely the slope of the line joining the two points. Unfortunately,
knowing \that a subject is exactly indierent between two choices" is not as simple as it
sounds. Indeed, even if we have been lucky enough to select a pairwise choice question in
which the individual truly is indierent, devising an incentive mechanism which motivates
the subject to reveal that indierence is not easy: indeed our payment mechanism does not
achieve this. Other experimentalists have used a sort of iterative procedure combined with
a Becker-Degroot- Marschak payment procedure, but we have serious doubts about this -
particularly once the subjects realise what is going on and tries to manipulate the iterative
procedure to maximise their payo (which is, of course, precisely what we want them to
do). The great advantage of the simple exogenised pairwise choice procedure that we have
used is its simplicity and clarity: subjects are precisely aware of what they have to do and
what is in their best interests to do.
But, given that pairwise choice questions are not particularly informative, we need to
ask a large number of questions. The more questions the better, as long as tiredness does
not set in. We feel that 100 questions in one experimental setting achieves the desired
trade-o between quantity of information and tiredness.
The precise questions used in the experiment were chosen as follows:
A total of 53 subjects participated in all ve sessions of the experiment. Given that we
treat all subjects as dierent and carry out our estimations subject by subject, the number of
subjects is in some sense arbitrary, particularly as we can not claim that our set of subjects is
in any way representative. But as the object of the experiment is to see if behaviour changes
over the repetitions, and perhaps converges through repetition, the number of subjects that
is appropriate is not well dened, though a number in excess of 50 seems appropriate if one
is interested in some kind of average behaviour over a not-unrepresentative set of subjects.
3 A Descriptive Analysis of the Results
Before we begin to t the preference functionals to the subjects' responses, we present some
simple descriptive statistics which indicate the nature of the randomness in behaviour and
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show how it changes over the course of the ve repetitions of the experiment. Recall that
each of the ve repetitions involved the same 100 questions. We can analyse whether the
same responses were given by the subjects on all 5 repetitions. Our analysis is done subject
by subject and is presented in Table 2. In this table, the rows represent the 53 subjects.
The column headed `1 to 2' indicates, for each subject, the number of questions on which
the subject's response diered between Repetition 1 and Repetition 2. Clearly the entry
would be 0 for a subject who gave precisely the same responses, and would be 100 if the
subject gave precisely contrary answers, that is, preference for Choice 1 on one of the two
repetitions and preference for Choice 2 on the second of the two
3
. The other columns
(`2 to 3', `3 to 4' and `4 to 5') are similarly dened. The column headed `total of these'
simply sums the previous 4 columns and is a crude measure of the overall randomness in
subjects' responses. However, it may well be misleading in that the subject may simply
switch preferences on a subset of questions. For example, suppose that a subject had xed
preferences for 90 of the 100 questions and on the remaining 10 questions oscillated regularly
between the two choices between repetitions. Then for this subject there would be a `10'
in the rst four columns of Table 2 and a `40' in the penultimate column. Now consider a
subject who also makes 10 changes in his or her stated preferences between each repetition
but, in contrast, these 10 changes are on a dierent set of 10 questions on each occasion.
This for this subject there would also be a `10' in the rst four columns of Table 2 and a
`40' in the penultimate column. However it could well be argued that this second subject is
more inconsistent than the rst. Accordingly, we present in the nal column of this table
a count of the number of questions on which the subject gave diering answers at some
stage of the experiment. Again a `0' indicates no changes (xed stated preferences) while a
`100' indicates that the subject changed his or her stated preferences at least once in all 100
questions. For the rst of the two examples presented above, the value in the nal column
would be 10, while the value for the second of the two examples would be 40. We note
that the dierence between the values in the two nal columns gives an indication of the
extent to which the variability is conned to a subset of the questions: a low value of this
3
It should be noted that the subjects received the questions in a random order and with the left/right
positioning randomised, but this table refers to the basic (unrandomised) questions as given in Table 1.
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dierence indicates the variability is spread across questions while a high value indicates
that it is conned to a subset of the questions.
Let us begin with the penultimate column - which indicates the total number of con-
secutive changes in stated preferences. Across subjects this varies considerably, from a
minimum of 4 (subject 46) to a maximum of 91 (subject 20), and there is a considerable
dispersion in between. The maximum possible value of this variable is 400, so there is a
reasonable degree of constancy for most of the subjects. If subjects were choosing totally at
random, we would expect on average 50 changes from repetition to repetition, giving a total
expected value of 200 for the gure in the penultimate column. The subject's responses
indicate clearly (at very low levels of signicance) that they were not anwering at random -
though clearly there is a considerable degree of variability in their responses. The gures in
the nal column of Table 2 is generally somewhat lower that the gures in the penultimate
column, and perhaps presents a more accurate picture of the variability in responses. The
minimum value in this column is 3 (subject 46) and the maximum of 48 (subject 20). All
the gures in this column are below 50, indicating that on at least half the questions sub-
jects had xed stated preferences. These gures cast considerable doubt on the Constant
Probability error specication of Harless and Camerer.
A measure of whether the variability is resticted to a subset of the questions is given
by the dierence between the penultimate and nal columns of the table. Generally this
dierence is of the same order of magnitude as the nal column itself - varying from a low
of 1 (subject 46) to a high of 43 (subject 20). These gures suggest that the probability
of making a mistake (as measured by the extent to which subjects give dierent responses
to the same question) is not constant across questions; this is consistent with the White
Noise error specication. However, indirect evidence (and not conclusive evidence) against
the White Noise error specication can be found in Table 3 which lists the violations of
dominance observed in the 5 repetitions. Recall that 5 of the 100 questions involved a pair
of risky choices, one of which dominated the other (in the sense of rst-degree stochastic
dominance). For all preference functionals (assuming only that the subjects prefer more
money to less) we would expect that dominance would be respected - that is, subjects
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would choose the dominating prospect of the two. Choosing the dominated prospect would
be a violation of dominance. Table 3 lists the numbers of such violations observed in our
experiment. This table clearly shows that such violations are extremely rare; indeed on
question 100 there were no violations at all. However, this table does suggest that on
certain such questions violations are more likely to be observed than on others. It may be
interesting to note that the structure of these 6 questions was as follows - in terms of the
relative positioning of the two points in the Marschak-Machina triangle:
 question 24: one point to the left of the other by a distance 1/8
 question 25: one point vertically above the other by a distance 1/8
 question 49: one point to the left of the other by a distance 1/8
 question 50: one point vertically above the other by a distance 1/8
 question 75: one point to the north-west of the other by a vertical and horizontal
distance 1/8
 question 100: one point to the north-west of the other by a vertical and horizontal
distance 1/8
It will be noticed that in Questions 75 and 100 the dominance is 'more obvious' (and
indeed stronger) than in the other questions. Perhaps it is not suprising that there are less
violations with these two questions. However there is not obvious reason why violations of
dominance are greatest with Question 25 - particularly as its structure is almost identical
to that of Question 50. One possibility is that Question 25 involves the three positive
outcomes ($25, $75 and $125) while Question 50 involves a negative outcome (-$25, $75
and $125). It could be argued that subjects tend to be more careful in answering questions
which involve losses.
Returning to Table 2 we can now examine how the inconsistency rate varies across the
5 repetitions. There are clearly (at least) two dierent kinds of subjects: those whose
inconsistency rates decline markedly over the ve repetions, and those whose inconsistency
rates remain roughly constant. Good examples of the former are subjects 1, 11, 36, 39, 46
10
and 48. Subject 46 is a particularly interesting example - indeed this subject's inconsistency
rate falls to zero and stays there. One might conclude from this that this subject had
identied his or her preference functional towards the end of the experiment
4
. Subject 1
seems to be in the same category.
Some subjects' inconsistency rates stay roughly constant throughout the experiment.
Good examples of this type of subject are subjects 6, 13, 14, 21, 26, 28, 42, 44 and 51. The
behaviour of such subjects might be described either by a given preference functional with
a given amount of error, or by a shifting preference functional. More light can be shed on
these two alternatives in the analysis that follows. But rst we introduce some important
theoretical constructs.
4 Preference Functionals Investigated
The descriptive statistics contained in the section above are useful for getting a feel for
the data, and, in particular, getting a feel for the magnitude of the variability in subjects'
responses. We now need to relate our analysis to the theoretical literature on preference
functionals (for decision-making under risk). We need to understand how well the various
preference functionals help us to explain decision making in this context. We can then begin
to explore the relationship between the variability that we have observed and to the correct
modelling of the underlying preference functional. We begin by describing a (subset of) the
preference functionals available in the literature. We then note that all of those considered
here are deterministic preference functionals in the sense that, given a pair of prospects, the
one that is preferred (using any of the preference functionals) is xed. We then confront this
with the results of our experiment - in which it is clear that stated preferences do change
even with xed pairwise choice problems. We discuss ways that this can be reconciled with
the theoretical literature - without abandoning that literature. We are then in a position to
use our data to analyse `how well' the various preference functionals describe the behaviour
in our experiment.
4
Interestingly, this subject's behaviour at the end of the experiment can be precisely explained by a
lexicographic (precisely minimax) preference function - by which we mean that the subject chooses that
prospect for which the probability of the worst outcome is least.
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The simplest preference functional for decision making under risk is Expected Value
maximisation. This, of course, is a special case (Risk Neutrality: RN) of the more general
Expected Utility (EU) maximisation. Both of these seem to have empirical shortcomings,
particularly as judged from the perspective of experimental evidence. Indeed, these de-
ciencies have led to the development of alternative theoretical models, as discussed above.
There are currently a large number of such alternatives, some more empirically valid than
others. We did not feel it useful to explore all the proposed alternatives, but restricted
attention to those that seem to have the highest empirical validity. We selected ve other
such functionals: Disppointment Aversion (DA); Prospective Reference (PR); Rank depen-
dent with the Power weighting function (RP); Rank dependent with the Quiggin weighting
function (RQ); and Weighted Utility (WU). We describe below the main features of the
various preference functional: details of these can be found in (Hey, 1997). The two letter
abbreviation is used to identify the functional. All the functionals are holistic and hence
postulate a preference functional V (:) which is used to rank prospects: hence p is preferred
to q if and only if V (p) > V (q). The theories dier in their specication of V (:)
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We
shall limit the descriptions to the case relevant for the experiments described in this paper
- where there are just 4 outcomes: x
1
, x
2
, x
3
and x
4
, with respective probabilities p
1
, p
2
, p
3
and p
4
.
RN : Risk Neutrality - subjects choose on the basis of expected value.
V (p) = p
1
x
1
+ p
2
x
2
+ p
3
x
3
+ p
4
x
4
(1)
EU : Expected Utility - subjects choose on the basis of expected utility.
V (p) = p
2
u(x
2
) + p
3
u(x
3
) + p
4
(2)
DA : Disappointment Aversion - subjects choose on the basis of expected (modied) utility
- where utility is modied ex post to take account of any disappointment or delight
5
We normalise throughout with u(x
1
) = 0 and u(x
4
) = 1.
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experienced.
V (p) = min(W
1
;W
2
;W
3
) (3)
where
W
1
=
(1 + )p
2
u(x
2
) + (1 + )p
3
u(x
3
) + p
4
1 + p
1
+ p
2
+ p
3
(4)
W
2
=
(1 + )p
2
u(x
2
) + p
3
u(x
3
) + p
4
1 + p
1
+ p
2
(5)
and
W
3
=
p
2
u(x
2
) + p
3
u(x
3
) + p
4
1 + p
1
(6)
PR : Prospective Reference - subjects choose on the basis of a weighted average of the
expected utility calculated using the correct probabilities and the expected utility
calculated using equal probabilities for all the non-null outcomes.
V (p) = (p
2
u(x
2
) + p
3
u(x
3
) + p
4
) + (1  )(a
2
u(x
2
) + a
3
u(x
3
) + a
4
) (7)
where a
i
= ja
i
j=(a
i
n(p)) and n(p) is the number of non-zero elements in p.
RP : Rank dependent with Power weighting function - subjects choose on the basis of
expected utility where the (cumulative) probabilities are distorted by a weighting
function which takes the power function form.
V (p) = w(p
2
+ p
3
+ p
4
)u(x
2
) + w(p
3
+ p
4
)(u(x
3
)  u(x
2
)) + w(p
4
)(1  u(x
3
)) (8)
where w(:) is the power function w(p) = p

.
RQ : Rank dependent with Quiggin weighting function - subjects choose on the basis of
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expected utility where the (cumulative) probabilities are distorted by a weighting
function which takes the form advocated by Quiggin amongst others.
V (p) = w(p
2
+ p
3
+ p
4
)u(x
2
) + w(p
3
+ p
4
)(u(x
3
)  u(x
2
)) + w(p
4
)(1  u(x
3
)) (9)
where w(:) is the `Quiggin' function w(p) = p

=[p

+ (1  p)

]
(1=)
.
WU : Weighted Utility - subjects choose on the basis of expected weighted utility.
V (p) =
w
2
p
2
u(x
2
) + w
3
p
3
u(x
3
) + w
4
p
4
w
1
p
1
+ w
2
p
2
+ w
3
p
3
+ w
4
p
4
(10)
All the generalisations of Expected Utility theory (DA, PR,RP,RQ andWU) involve
one parameter extra to EU in the context of these experiments: DA has Gul's  parameter;
PR has Viscusi's  parameter; RP and RQ have the weighting function's  parameter;
andWU has the w weighting parameter.
5 Errors
The problem, as we have already identied, with these preference functionals, is that they
are all deterministic. However it is clear from our experiment (and others) that subjects'
behaviour is not deterministic, but that there is a lot of noise in the responses of subjects
in such experiments. The clearest way to see this is to examine, as we have done above,
the choices of subjects when confronted with the same pairwise choice question on dierent
occasions (either within the same experimental setting or across dierent sessions): it is
very clear that dierent responses are given on dierent occasions. How do we accommodate
this? There are a number of ways.
One possibility is that subjects are responding to the experiment as a whole - considering
it as a single response to 500 pairwise choice questions. We have discussed this above and
have tried to argue that this story is unrealistic. In any case it would be extremely dicult
to estimate, involving 2
500
= 3:27  10
150
possibilities, an extraordinarily large number.
To estimate the `best tting' preference functional under this scenario would require the
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computation of the likelihood (under some appropriate stochastic specication) at each of
these 2
500
= 3:27  10
150
points for each possible value of the parameter set. This is well
beyond the capabilities of present day computors. (This emphasises the absurdity of this
story - implying as it does that human beings can carry out such enormous calculations.)
There are simpler alternatives. The two obvious contenders are rstly that the subjects
have stochastic preference functions, and secondly that subjects have deterministic pref-
erence functions but `implement' them with error. The rst of these has been explored
elsewhere in a limited form
6
(see (Carbone, 1997)) but this is computationally dicult
and involves tting a large number of parameters. The second is computationally simpler
and seems to be a simpler description of behaviour. We adopt that here, though some
specication of the error structure must be selected. There are two possibilities that have
already been explored in the literature: the White Noise specication of (Hey and Orme,
1994) and the Constant Probability specication of (Harless and Camerer, 1994). There
are diculties with both of these. The White Noise specication eectively assumes that
subjects make measurement errors when calculating the value of their preference function,
with the variance of the error constant across questions. This seems to be empirically invalid
when the two prospects being compared are such that one prospect dominates the other
7
.
The Constant Probability specication (which assumes that the probability of the subject
mistakenly reporting his or her preference is constant across all questions) also suers from
this defect but additionally has the problem that it implies that the error probability is the
same whether the prospects are far apart in the subject's preference or whether they are
close together
8
. We adopt here the White Noise specication, though our results should
be interpreted in the light of the possible deciences of the specication. We assume that
the White Noise error, the measurement error, is normally distributed with zero mean and
constant variance. The variance, of course, is subject-specic and we estimate it along with
the parameters of the preference functionals that we are tting.
6
Restricted to the Expected Utility functional.
7
Experimental evidence seems to suggest that mistakes are very much less frequent with these types of
questions than with others, where neither prospect dominates the other.
8
Experimental evidence seems to suggest that the probability of making a mistake is less when the
prospects are far apart.
15
6 Ways of Fitting the Data to the Set of Theories
Because of these `errors', it is inevitable that in general, none of the preference functionals
developed in the theoretical literature describes any of the subject's behaviour precisely
(for any parameters). We therefore need to nd a method of choosing parameters for which
particular preference functionals t `as well as possible'. We use the method familiar to
economists, that of choosing parameters which maximise the likelihood function - given the
stochastic specication that we have adopted. Given that we assume that the White Noise
error is normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, we eectively have the
Probit specication. However, since not all the preference functionals are linear in their
parameters, we can not use standard probit estimation routines, because they typically
assume linearity. Accordingly we have written our own Maximum Likelihood routines,
using the GAUSS software package
9
.
7 A Statistical Analysis of the Results
The descriptive analysis of Section 3 above gives us some insight into the behaviour of the
subjects. However, if we want to answer the questions as to which of the various preference
functionals best describes behaviour, and whether the repetition within the experiment
leads to one particular best-tting preference functional, we need to t the various func-
tionals to the observations. We proceed as outlined above: we t the various preference
functionals subject by subject, choosing the parameters of the respective functionals to
maximise the (log of the) likelihood of observing the choices, given our White Noise as-
sumption about the errors implicit in behaviour. We do this rst repetition by repetition.
For each subject, for each repetition, and for each preference functional we thus get a max-
imised log-likelihood which can be used to compare the goodness of t of the respective
preference functionals subject by subject and repetition by repetition. However, since the
various preference functionals dier in terms of the number of parameters involved in their
estimation, we need to correct the maximised log-likelihood for their varying degrees of
9
Our estimation programs are available on request.
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freedom. To be specic:
 Risk Neutrality involves one parameter (the standard deviation of the error) .
 Expected Utility involves the utility parameters u
2
(= the utility of $25) and u
3
(=
the utility of $75)
10
and  (the standard deviation of the error).
 Disappointment Aversion involves the utility parameters u
2
and u
3
,  and the `dis-
appointment aversion' parameter .
 Prospective Reference involves the utility parameters u
2
and u
3
,  and Viscusi's pa-
rameter .
 Rank dependent with the Power weighting function involves the utility parameters u
2
and u
3
,  and the power exponent parameter .
 Rank dependent with the Quiggin weighting function involves the utility parameters
u
2
and u
3
,  and Quiggin's parameter .
 Weighted Utility involves the utility parameters u
2
and u
3
,  and the weight parameter
w.
So RN has one parameter, EU has 3, while all the others have 4. To correct the max-
imised log-likelihood for the numbers of parameters involved in the estimation (the number
of degrees of freedom) we use the Akaike criterion, which involves penalising the maximised
log-likelihood function by subtracting from it the number of degrees of freedom. Accord-
ingly we obtain for each tted preference functional a `corrected' maximised log-likelihood,
which can then be used to rank the various tted preference functionals. Proceeding in
this way we obtain Table 4. In this we list, for each subject and for each repetition, the
preference functional for which the corrected maximised log-likelihood was highest - that
is, the preference functional which came out best on what we term the Akaike Ranking.
We also repeat the exercise for the preference functional tted to all the data combined for
each subject - that is the preference functional tted to the data for all 500 observations
10
Recall that we are normalising u
1
(= the utility of -$25) = 0 and u
4
(= the utility of $125) = 1.
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for each subject. The preference functional which emerged as best on the Akaike Ranking
is listed in the nal column of Table 4.
Perhaps the only clear thing to emerge from Table 4 is the large amount of variability
in the best-tting
11
functional. There are some subjects for whom a stable preference
functional seems to emerge by the end of the experiment - examples are subject 8 (WU),
18 (DA), 24 (RQ), 30 (RQ) and 38 (EU) - but for the majority, there is little, if any,
convergence. It could, however, be argued that this test is too tough and hides small
variations in the maximised log-likelihoods. Accordingly it might be useful to consider
alternative analyses.
An alternative way to proceed is the following. We know that EU is nested within the
more general preference functionals (DA, PR, RP, RQ and WU) - for each of these latter
preference functionals one parameter restriction
12
reduces the more general functional to
EU. Furthermore we know that RN is nested within EU - two parameter restrictions
13
reduce EU to RN. We might then rst ask whether EU ts signicantly better than RN (at
some appropriate signicance level), and then if it does, ask whether any of the more general
preference functions t signicantly better than EU (at some appropriate signicance level),
and nally, if more than one does, choose the `best' of these using the maximised log-
likelihoods
14
. Proceeding in this way, we obtain Table 5 if we use a 5% signicance level
and Table 6 if we use a 1% signicance level.
Table 5 shows two things: rst, and rather obviously, EU emerges more often as the
`best-tting' preference functional than in Table 4 but this is simply because the more
general preference functionals are included in Table 5 only if they are signicantly better
that the less general. Secondly, but not invariably, we get some increased convergence.
When we repeat the exercise using a 1% level of signicance we get Table 6. Once again,
and not surprisingly, we get an increased preponderance of cases in which EU emerges as
the best-tting functional. Rather more interestingly, we get an increased number of cases
of convergence: subjects 1, 4, 8, 12, 18, 21, 25, 26, 31, 32, 34, 38, 45, 46, 48, 51 and 53 seem
11
As dened by this Akaike criterion.
12
Specically,  = 0 for DA,  = 1 for PR,  = 1 for both RP and RQ and w = 1 for WU.
13
Specically, u
2
= 1=3 and u
3
= 2=3.
14
Given that all the more general preference functionals have the same number of degrees of freedom.
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all to converge to EU by the end of experiment. In contrast the number of subjects for
whom a non-EU preference functional is the convergent state is reduced - though subject 5
converges to RQ, 27 to WU, 30 to RQ, 37 to RQ, 40 to RP and 50 to RQ.
The conclusion from these analyses is that there does appear to be some degree of
convergence for some subjects, though for perhaps the majority the variability remains
high.
The problem with these analyses is that they are essentially statistical in nature. We,
as economists, might be more interested in the economic signicance of the results. Given
that the EU preference functional is much easier to apply to the economic analysis of
behaviour, we might want to know how far wrong we might be if we use the EU functional
rather than the alternatives in such applications. It is not obvious how we might answer
this question as it depends upon the particular application. But we could ask how often we
would make mistakes in the prediction of behaviour using the various preference functionals.
This depends upon the predictions we are wanting to make. One possibility is to use the
specic questions asked in this experiment - though it should be noted that the results of
this analysis does depend upon the specic questions. It might be better to use some kind
of generally-accepted set of questions - which can be used to test the various functionals -
but such a set is not available and it is not clear how such a set could be constructed (and
then made generally-acceptable).
The result of such an analysis are presented in Tables 7 through 16. There are two
sets of tables here: Tables 7 through 11, which present the results of an analysis based on
estimations repetition by repetition, and Tables 12 through 16 which present the results of
an analysis based on estimations over all 5 repetitions. Let us begin with the rst set.
For example, Table 7 refers to Repetition 1. For each subject, we count, for each
preference functional, the number of questions (out of 100) for which (the best-tting of)
that preference functional incorrectly predicts the stated preference of that subject. For
example, the RN preference functional predicts incorrectly 33 of the 100 responses of subject
1, th EU functional 7 of the 100, and so on. It is clear from Table 7 that Risk Neutrality does
particularly badly at predicting behaviour but that the other functionals do much better. In
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general, the more general preference functionals make fewer mistakes in prediction, though
this is hardly surprising
15
.
Tables 7 through 11 present the analyses with estimations repetition by repetition.
The column labelled `maximum dierence' calculates the dierence between the number
of incorrect predictions using the EU functional and the number of incorrect predictions
using the functional which has the smallest number of such incorrect predictions. For some
subjects this is 0 - implying that using EU instead of `best-tting' preference functional
leads to no extra mistakes in prediction. However for some subjects this is as high as 13
(Subject 50 on Repetition 5), though it is below 10 in all except 2 cases. This suggests
that using EU does not impose too great a cost in terms of predictability. One interesting
question to ask is whether there is any relationship between this `maximum dierence' and
the basic inconsistency in subjects' responses. Accordingly, we append to Tables 7 through
11 a column labelled `average inconsistency' which is the average (one-quarter) of the `total
of these' column of Table 2. This indicates the average number of questions in which the
subjects' responses changed between repetitions. It is apparent that there is no systematic
relationship between this variable and the `maximum dierence' of the penultimate column.
For example, on Repetition 1, (see Table 7 Subject 20, who has a very high variability in
responses, has behaviour which is almost as well explained with the EU functional as with
the more general functionals. In contrast, Subject 48, who has a relatively small variability,
also has a relatively small `maximum dierence'.
A similar analysis is contained in Tables 12 through 16 though here the predictions
are made (and the number of incorrect predictions calculated) using the appropriate best
ttin preference functional using all 500 observations. Similarly the `average inconsistency'
column of this is the average (one-quarter) of the `over all 5' column of Table 2. Recall this
is the total number of questions, over all 5 repetitions, on which the subject gave dierent
responses at some stage of the experiment. The nal columns of Tables 12 through 16 can
15
Though not inevitable: the functionals were tted on the basis of maximising the likelihood, not on
the basis of maximising the score - that is the number of correct predictions. Accordingly, it could be the
case that the number of incorrect predictions is lower for EU, for example, than for one of the the more
general functions (this, in fact happens for Subject 51 in Table 14). Moreover, it is not necessarily the case
that the preference functional which is best in Table 4 has the smallest number of incorrect predictions -
the reason, once again, being that the Akaike criterion maximises the corrected log-likelihood and not the
score.
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thus be considered as an average variability in responses over the experiment as a whole, and
therefore is the appropriate `conjugate' variable to go with the across-repetitions estimates
of these tables. Here again there is no obvious relationship between the nal two columns
of Tables 12 through 16. There are examples of subjects where the `maximum dierence'
is low, and where the `average inconsistency' is high and also where it is low. For example,
both Subjects 25 and 34 both have a `maximum dierence' of 0 but `average inconsistencies'
of 11.5 and 1.5 respectively. Indeed these tables indicate that there are dierent kinds of
subjects with dierent kinds of behaviour.
Tables 12 through 16 are important in the sense that the numbers in the `maximum
dierence' columns are typically very low. Occasionally they are negative (for reasons
discussed in a footnote above) and they are all below 10. This indicates that if one is
working with the combined data, to predict behaviour in individual contexts, then the use
of the EU preference functional leads generally to errors which are remarkably low.
8 Conclusions
There are two important preliminary conclusions from this experiment: rst, that there
is a high degree of variability in subjects' responses, even in an experiment as simple as
this; second, that there is a high degree of variability in subjects' behaviour during the
experiment. We expand on these points below.
The variability of subjects' responses is high - the average percentage of dierently
answered questions between two repetitions is generally between 5 and 15 though it varies
considerably across subjects. The average percentage of questions answered dierently at
some stage of the experiment is lower and is usually under 10, indicating that that the
variability is limited to a subset of the questions. Across the repetitions the variability
of responses declines for some subjects but stays constant for others (and indeed actually
increases for a small number of subjects). For those subjects for whom the variability
declines through time, it could be thought that these subjects are evolving their preference
functional through the repetitions. There is some limited evidence that the majority of
these are converging to the Expected Utility functional. For those subjects for whom
21
the variability remains constant, it could be thought that their preferences are xed (even
though there is some noise in the expression of those preferences), but the evidence provided
by the estimated preference functionals does not always conrm this
16
.
In terms of the best-tting preference functional, no clear picture emerges. If one con-
nes attention to the nal repetition, it would seem that EU is emerging as the best function
(in Table 6 for 27 out of the 53 subjects EU is the `best' functional), though there is a con-
ict between that and the `best-tting' functional using the combined data: if we compare
the nal two columns of Table 6 we see that there is often a conict. Perhaps the ap-
propriate strategy is to use the combined data when variablity is roughly constant and to
use the data from the fth repetition when the variability declines through the repetitions.
Indeed there is clearly a problem for those subjects whose variability remains constant: the
`best-tting' functional changes from repetition to repetition. A good example is Subject 6
for whom the `best-tting' functional (from Table 6) is EU, EU, RQ, RQ and WU for the
5 repetitions individually and WU overall. If WU is indeed this subject's true functional
then the estimates from individual repetitions may be seriously misleading.
We seem to have the following preliminary conclusion: for those subjects whose vari-
ability is decreasing through the repetitions, we should take the estimated functional in the
nal repetition as their true functional; in contrast, for those subjects whose variability is
roughly constant we should take the functional estimated over all 5 repetitions.
There is an additional conclusion: the increased errors in predictions using EU rather
than the `best-tting' functional are generally low. Moreover, the magnitude of these errors
in comparison to the variability of the subjects' responses are generally very small: if we
compare the nal two columns of Tables 7 through 16 we see that almost invariably the nal
column is larger than the penultimate. This means that the errors that the economist makes
in predicting behaviour are generally of a smaller order of magnitude than the error that the
subjects make themselves
17
. This clearly indicates that the way forward is to understand
better the variability in subjects' responses: rening the deterministic preference functionals
16
For example, Subject 42 has roughly constant variability, but the best-tting functional varies: using
the 1% criterion, DA, DA, RQ, WU and DA for the 5 repetitions and DA overall.
17
Care should be taken in interpreting this conclusion in that the predictions are within-sample predic-
tions, and generally the economist has to produce outside-sample predictions.
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is not going to help if there is this innate randomness in subjects' behaviour. We need to
understand better this innate randomness.
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Table 1: The 100 Pairwise Choice Questions
Question Choice 1 Choice 2
Number p
1
p
2
p
3
p
4
p
1
p
2
p
3
p
4
1 .0 .0 .875 .125 .0 .125 .0 .875
2 .0 .0 .875 .125 .0 .125 .0 .875
3 .0 .0 .875 .125 .0 .125 .5 .375
4 .0 .0 .875 .125 .0 .375 .0 .625
5 .0 .0 .875 .125 .0 .375 .125 .5
6 .0 .0 .875 .125 .0 .375 .25 .375
7 .0 .0 .875 .125 .0 .625 .0 .375
8 .0 .125 .5 .375 .0 .375 .0 .625
9 .0 .125 .5 .375 .0 .375 .125 .5
10 .0 .125 .875 .0 .0 .375 .0 .625
11 .0 .125 .875 .0 .0 .375 .125 .5
12 .0 .125 .875 .0 .0 .375 .25 .375
13 .0 .125 .875 .0 .0 .375 .5 .125
14 .0 .125 .875 .0 .0 .625 .0 .375
15 .0 .125 .875 .0 .0 .875 .0 .125
16 .0 .25 .75 .0 .0 .375 .0 .625
17 .0 .25 .75 .0 .0 .375 .125 .5
18 .0 .25 .75 .0 .0 .375 .25 .375
19 .0 .25 .75 .0 .0 .375 .5 .125
20 .0 .25 .75 .0 .0 .375 .5 .125
21 .0 .25 .75 .0 .0 .625 .0 .375
22 .0 .25 .75 .0 .0 .875 .0 .125
23 .0 .375 .5 .125 .0 .625 .0 .375
24 .0 .125 .875 .0 .0 .25 .75 .0
25 .0 .375 .125 .5 .0 .375 .25 .375
26 .0 .0 .5 .5 .125 .0 .25 .625
27 .0 .0 .5 .5 .125 .0 .25 .625
28 .0 .0 .875 .125 .125 .0 .25 .625
29 .0 .0 .875 .125 .125 .0 .625 .25
30 .0 .0 .875 .125 .375 .0 .375 .25
31 .0 .0 .875 .125 .5 .0 .0 .5
32 .0 .0 .875 .125 .75 .0 .0 .25
33 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .125 .0 .25 .625
34 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .125 .0 .625 .25
35 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .375 .0 .375 .25
36 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .5 .0 .0 .5
37 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .75 .0 .0 .25
38 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .75 .0 .0 .25
39 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .75 .0 .125 .125
40 .125 .0 .625 .25 .5 .0 .0 .5
41 .25 .0 .75 .0 .375 .0 .375 .25
42 .25 .0 .75 .0 .5 .0 .0 .5
43 .25 .0 .75 .0 .75 .0 .0 .25
44 .25 .0 .75 .0 .75 .0 .125 .125
45 .375 .0 .375 .25 .5 .0 .0 .5
46 .375 .0 .625 .0 .5 .0 .0 .5
47 .375 .0 .625 .0 .75 .0 .0 .25
48 .375 .0 .625 .0 .75 .0 .125 .125
49 .25 .0 .75 .0 .375 .0 .625 .0
50 .75 .0 .0 .25 .75 .0 .125 .125
51 .0 .75 .0 .25 .25 .375 .0 .375
52 .0 .75 .0 .25 .375 .125 .0 .5
53 .0 .75 .0 .25 .625 .0 .0 .375
54 .0 .875 .0 .125 .25 .375 .0 .375
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Table 1: The 100 Pairwise Choice Questions
Question Choice 1 Choice 2
Number p
1
p
2
p
3
p
4
p
1
p
2
p
3
p
4
55 .0 .875 .0 .125 .375 .125 .0 .5
56 .0 .875 .0 .125 .5 .25 .0 .25
57 .0 .875 .0 .125 .625 .0 .0 .375
58 .0 .875 .0 .125 .625 .125 .0 .25
59 .125 .75 .0 .125 .25 .375 .0 .375
60 .125 .75 .0 .125 .375 .125 .0 .5
61 .125 .75 .0 .125 .5 .25 .0 .25
62 .125 .75 .0 .125 .625 .0 .0 .375
63 .125 .75 .0 .125 .625 .125 .0 .25
64 .125 .875 .0 .0 .25 .375 .0 .375
65 .125 .875 .0 .0 .375 .125 .0 .5
66 .125 .875 .0 .0 .5 .25 .0 .25
67 .125 .875 .0 .0 .625 .0 .0 .375
68 .125 .875 .0 .0 .625 .125 .0 .25
69 .125 .875 .0 .0 .75 .125 .0 .125
70 .125 .875 .0 .0 .875 .0 .0 .125
71 .125 .875 .0 .0 .875 .0 .0 .125
72 .25 .375 .0 .375 .375 .125 .0 .5
73 .5 .25 .0 .25 .625 .0 .0 .375
74 .5 .25 .0 .25 .625 .0 .0 .375
75 .0 .75 .0 .25 .125 .75 .0 .125
76 .0 .75 .25 .0 .125 .0 .875 .0
77 .0 .75 .25 .0 .125 .375 .5 .0
78 .0 .75 .25 .0 .375 .125 .5 .0
79 .0 .75 .25 .0 .375 .25 .375 .0
80 .0 .75 .25 .0 .5 .0 .5 .0
81 .0 .75 .25 .0 .5 .125 .375 .0
82 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .125 .0 .875 .0
83 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .125 .375 .5 .0
84 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .25 .625 .125 .0
85 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .375 .125 .5 .0
86 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .375 .25 .375 .0
87 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .5 .0 .5 .0
88 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .5 .0 .5 .0
89 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .5 .125 .375 .0
90 .0 1.0 .0 .0 .75 .125 .125 .0
91 .25 .625 .125 .0 .375 .125 .5 .0
92 .25 .625 .125 .0 .375 .25 .375 .0
93 .25 .625 .125 .0 .5 .0 .5 .0
94 .25 .625 .125 .0 .5 .125 .375 .0
95 .375 .25 .375 .0 .5 .0 .5 .0
96 .375 .25 .375 .0 .5 .0 .5 .0
97 .375 .625 .0 .0 .5 .0 .5 .0
98 .375 .625 .0 .0 .5 .125 .375 .0
99 .375 .625 .0 .0 .75 .125 .125 .0
100 .375 .125 .5 .0 .5 .125 .375 .0
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Table 2: Inconsistency rates between repetitions
Subject Repetition total over
Number 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 5 of these all 5
1 9 3 4 1 17 9
2 13 9 5 7 34 20
3 8 11 9 8 36 19
4 8 10 9 5 32 18
5 10 14 8 4 36 18
6 13 13 11 14 51 29
7 16 9 9 7 41 25
8 12 16 17 14 59 32
9 17 12 10 10 49 24
10 18 10 4 6 38 28
11 9 5 3 2 19 12
12 6 4 3 2 15 8
13 13 15 13 12 53 26
14 11 13 9 13 46 27
15 12 12 10 11 45 28
16 10 7 13 12 42 23
17 12 12 14 23 61 38
18 12 10 10 8 40 23
19 9 12 17 15 53 32
20 29 22 18 22 91 48
21 15 14 10 14 53 30
22 5 8 11 7 31 17
23 7 8 11 16 42 25
24 13 12 20 11 56 30
25 22 19 25 17 83 46
26 14 17 19 13 63 40
27 22 16 19 10 67 39
28 3 7 11 7 28 16
29 9 12 8 5 34 20
30 7 13 11 5 36 19
31 13 14 7 9 43 22
32 6 6 3 4 19 10
33 8 9 8 6 31 18
34 4 3 3 3 13 6
35 4 9 13 13 39 23
36 11 6 3 3 23 18
37 12 11 5 10 38 22
38 22 16 12 11 61 31
39 8 12 3 2 25 18
40 12 6 6 8 32 17
41 15 12 17 14 58 30
42 13 15 16 12 56 31
43 11 8 15 14 48 26
44 4 3 4 4 15 9
45 7 1 2 3 13 11
46 3 1 0 0 4 3
47 9 9 5 5 28 15
48 14 9 4 4 31 22
49 10 14 10 6 40 23
50 9 6 9 9 33 18
51 14 9 12 10 45 22
52 19 18 14 14 65 36
53 14 9 14 9 46 25
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Table 3: Violations of Dominance
Question Repetition
Number 1 2 3 4 5
24 2 1 0 2 1
25 1 5 3 2 3
49 1 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 2 0
75 0 0 0 0 1
100 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 4: Best models on Akaike Ranking
Subject Repetition all
Number 1 2 3 4 5 combined
1 RQ PR PR RQ EU PR
2 PR RQ RQ RQ RQ PR
3 RQ DA WU RP WU RQ
4 WU EU RQ EU WU WU
5 WU RQ DA RQ RQ RQ
6 WU RQ RQ RQ WU WU
7 DA WU EU WU RP DA
8 WU RQ WU WU WU WU
9 RQ WU EU RP RP WU
10 EU RP WU WU RP RP
11 RP DA RQ RQ RQ RP
12 RQ RP DA EU DA RQ
13 RQ RP PR PR PR PR
14 PR WU WU WU DA WU
15 EU RQ DA DA WU WU
16 WU RQ DA PR RQ RQ
17 WU WU RP WU PR WU
18 WU RP DA DA DA DA
19 DA RQ RQ WU PR RQ
20 RQ EU RP WU RP DA
21 EU RP PR PR DA PR
22 DA RP RP RP RP RP
23 DA RQ DA RQ PR RQ
24 RQ RQ RQ RQ RQ RQ
25 PR WU WU PR WU WU
26 WU RP RP EU EU RP
27 RP WU WU WU WU WU
28 RQ RQ DA PR WU RQ
29 RP RP PR RQ RQ PR
30 WU RQ RQ RQ RQ RQ
31 WU EU EU EU WU WU
32 EU DA RP RP RP RP
33 RQ WU RQ DA RQ RQ
34 EU RP EU WU EU RP
35 RQ RQ DA WU EU RQ
36 RQ RP PR RQ RP DA
37 PR RQ RQ RQ RQ PR
38 EU DA EU EU EU EU
39 RP EU RQ RQ PR PR
40 PR PR PR RP RP PR
41 WU PR WU PR RQ PR
42 DA DA RQ WU DA DA
43 EU EU EU RP EU EU
44 RQ RP RQ RP RQ RP
45 PR DA DA RQ DA WU
46 RQ EU EU EU EU RQ
47 DA RQ DA DA RQ RQ
48 EU DA DA WU DA WU
49 PR RP EU RQ PR EU
50 RQ RP RP RQ RQ RQ
51 EU EU RP EU RP EU
52 EU PR PR PR DA PR
53 DA WU PR RP RP RP
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Table 5: Best models on signicance (5 per cent) and ranking
Subject Repetition all
Number 1 2 3 4 5 combined
1 RQ EU PR EU EU PR
2 PR RQ RQ RQ RQ PR
3 EU DA WU RP WU RQ
4 EU EU EU EU WU WU
5 WU RQ DA RQ RQ RQ
6 WU EU RQ RQ WU WU
7 EU WU EU WU RP EU
8 WU RQ WU WU EU WU
9 RQ WU EU RP RP WU
10 EU RP WU WU RP RP
11 RP DA RQ RQ RQ RP
12 RQ RP DA EU EU RQ
13 RQ RP PR PR PR PR
14 PR WU WU WU DA WU
15 EU RQ DA DA WU WU
16 WU RQ DA PR RQ RQ
17 WU WU RP WU PR WU
18 WU EU EU EU EU DA
19 DA RQ RQ WU EU RQ
20 RQ EU RP WU RP DA
21 EU EU EU EU DA EU
22 DA RP RP RP RP RP
23 DA EU EU RQ EU RQ
24 RQ RQ RQ RQ RQ RQ
25 PR EU WU EU WU WU
26 EU RP RP EU EU RP
27 RP WU WU WU WU WU
28 RQ RQ EU PR WU RQ
29 EU RP PR RQ RQ PR
30 WU RQ RQ RQ RQ RQ
31 WU EU EU EU WU WU
32 EU DA RP RP EU RP
33 RQ WU RQ EU RQ RQ
34 EU RP EU EU EU RP
35 RQ RQ DA WU EU RQ
36 RQ EU EU RQ RP DA
37 PR RQ RQ RQ RQ PR
38 EU EU EU EU EU EU
39 RP EU RQ RQ PR PR
40 PR PR PR RP RP PR
41 WU EU WU PR RQ PR
42 DA DA RQ WU DA DA
43 EU EU EU RP EU EU
44 RQ RP RQ RP RQ RP
45 PR DA DA EU EU WU
46 RQ EU EU EU EU RQ
47 DA RQ DA DA RQ RQ
48 EU DA EU WU DA EU
49 PR EU EU EU PR EU
50 RQ RP RP RQ RQ RQ
51 EU EU RP EU EU EU
52 EU PR PR PR DA PR
53 DA WU PR RP RP EU
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Table 6: Best models on signicance (1 per cent) and Ranking
Subject Repetition all
Number 1 2 3 4 5 combined
1 RQ EU EU EU EU PR
2 PR RQ RQ RQ RQ PR
3 EU EU WU RP EU RQ
4 EU EU EU EU EU WU
5 EU EU DA RQ RQ RQ
6 EU EU RQ RQ WU WU
7 EU EU EU WU EU EU
8 WU RQ EU EU EU WU
9 RQ EU EU RP EU WU
10 EU EU WU WU RP RP
11 RP DA RQ RQ RQ RP
12 RQ EU DA EU EU RQ
13 EU RP PR PR PR PR
14 EU WU WU EU DA WU
15 EU EU DA DA WU WU
16 WU RQ DA PR RQ RQ
17 WU EU RP WU PR WU
18 WU EU EU EU EU DA
19 DA RQ RQ WU EU RQ
20 RQ EU RP WU EU DA
21 EU EU EU EU EU EU
22 DA EU RP RP EU RP
23 DA EU EU RQ EU RQ
24 RQ RQ EU RQ RQ RQ
25 EU EU EU EU EU WU
26 EU RP EU EU EU RP
27 RP WU WU WU WU WU
28 RQ RQ EU PR WU RQ
29 EU EU PR RQ RQ PR
30 WU RQ EU RQ RQ RQ
31 EU EU EU EU EU WU
32 EU EU EU EU EU RP
33 RQ WU RQ EU RQ RQ
34 EU EU EU EU EU EU
35 RQ RQ EU WU EU RQ
36 RQ EU EU RQ RP DA
37 PR RQ RQ RQ RQ PR
38 EU EU EU EU EU EU
39 RP EU RQ RQ PR PR
40 PR EU PR RP RP PR
41 WU EU WU PR RQ PR
42 DA DA RQ WU DA DA
43 EU EU EU RP EU EU
44 RQ RP RQ RP RQ RP
45 EU DA DA EU EU WU
46 RQ EU EU EU EU RQ
47 DA RQ DA DA RQ RQ
48 EU DA EU EU EU EU
49 EU EU EU EU PR EU
50 RQ RP RP RQ RQ RQ
51 EU EU RP EU EU EU
52 EU PR EU PR EU PR
53 EU EU EU EU EU EU
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Table 7: Incorrect Predictions, Individual Estimates, Repetition 1
Subject Repetition maximum average
Number RN EU DA PR RP RQ WU dierence inconsistency
1 33 7 7 6 2 3 7 5 4.25
2 29 13 14 9 9 10 8 5 8.50
3 34 7 6 7 7 7 5 2 9.00
4 21 16 16 15 16 15 12 4 8.00
5 31 5 5 5 5 3 3 2 9.00
6 18 12 12 8 12 10 11 4 12.75
7 33 8 10 9 11 9 7 1 10.25
8 25 9 9 7 8 5 7 4 14.75
9 28 14 13 12 16 13 14 2 12.25
10 35 7 7 6 6 5 7 2 9.50
11 33 9 9 8 6 9 9 3 4.75
12 35 5 5 5 2 1 3 4 3.75
13 15 8 8 8 8 7 8 1 13.25
14 19 7 7 10 8 10 10 0 11.50
15 9 8 8 8 7 6 7 2 11.25
16 26 9 6 7 9 8 6 3 10.50
17 15 10 10 9 9 10 3 7 15.25
18 16 12 9 11 12 8 7 5 10.00
19 30 16 12 12 18 10 14 6 13.25
20 29 22 21 23 23 22 22 1 22.75
21 21 15 10 11 10 12 14 5 13.25
22 17 6 4 7 5 6 7 2 7.75
23 22 13 9 11 13 11 10 4 10.50
24 29 12 9 8 12 8 12 4 14.00
25 32 15 14 15 15 15 14 1 20.75
26 11 9 9 8 9 7 9 2 15.75
27 22 15 15 11 13 15 15 4 16.75
28 31 9 6 4 5 2 6 7 7.00
29 26 7 7 7 8 5 6 2 8.50
30 24 12 11 11 10 10 10 2 9.00
31 31 12 10 11 11 12 7 5 10.75
32 34 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 4.75
33 32 12 14 9 10 3 7 9 7.75
34 6 2 2 2 4 2 2 0 3.25
35 36 3 3 3 2 2 3 1 9.75
36 30 3 6 4 3 6 3 0 5.75
37 32 12 11 9 11 8 11 4 9.50
38 33 12 12 12 12 12 14 0 15.25
39 21 9 9 8 10 9 10 1 6.25
40 24 13 13 6 12 5 11 8 8.00
41 13 19 19 13 15 17 12 7 14.50
42 34 19 14 18 15 15 26 5 14.00
43 21 8 8 7 8 7 7 1 12.00
44 37 7 7 7 4 3 5 4 3.75
45 34 8 8 6 8 7 7 2 3.25
46 38 4 4 3 2 0 0 4 1.00
47 27 12 10 11 13 10 7 5 7.00
48 20 11 12 10 11 11 11 1 7.75
49 23 13 12 8 13 9 11 5 10.00
50 40 11 9 11 8 6 11 5 8.25
51 30 9 9 9 9 8 7 2 11.25
52 18 16 16 16 16 16 16 0 16.25
53 31 9 11 11 10 10 11 -1 11.50
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Table 8: Incorrect Predictions, Individual Estimates, Repetition 2
Subject Repetition maximum average
Number RN EU DA PR RP RQ WU dierence inconsistency
1 38 3 3 2 3 2 3 1 4.25
2 33 10 9 6 8 6 10 4 8.50
3 31 8 7 6 10 7 8 2 9.00
4 20 15 15 15 15 15 14 1 8.00
5 33 9 8 8 9 8 7 2 9.00
6 17 14 14 15 14 15 18 0 12.75
7 38 8 8 9 9 9 7 1 10.25
8 25 16 16 13 11 14 15 5 14.75
9 27 9 15 10 11 11 8 1 12.25
10 25 13 13 8 12 10 13 5 9.50
11 32 5 1 5 4 2 1 4 4.75
12 35 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 3.75
13 18 14 14 15 12 15 14 2 13.25
14 21 11 9 9 9 9 5 6 11.50
15 17 11 12 9 11 9 7 4 11.25
16 29 7 6 4 7 3 5 4 10.50
17 21 13 13 14 13 15 9 4 15.25
18 22 12 12 12 8 11 10 4 10.00
19 27 17 15 12 16 12 14 5 13.25
20 30 19 20 19 17 19 19 2 22.75
21 15 10 10 8 11 10 13 2 13.25
22 18 11 8 10 9 10 9 3 7.75
23 19 5 6 7 8 3 4 2 10.50
24 26 9 7 7 9 7 5 4 14.00
25 27 16 17 16 20 18 14 2 20.75
26 14 12 14 13 10 13 15 2 15.75
27 13 14 14 13 17 13 15 1 16.75
28 34 5 1 3 2 0 1 5 7.00
29 27 8 8 6 8 5 7 3 8.50
30 27 14 9 7 14 5 7 9 9.00
31 26 11 10 10 11 10 12 1 10.75
32 33 5 3 4 4 3 4 2 4.75
33 28 9 8 7 7 8 6 3 7.75
34 7 2 3 1 4 2 3 1 3.25
35 35 4 2 4 3 2 4 2 9.75
36 31 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 5.75
37 41 17 15 8 15 10 14 9 9.50
38 34 20 18 18 18 19 16 4 15.25
39 20 10 10 9 10 10 11 1 6.25
40 23 9 7 11 10 11 9 2 8.00
41 17 9 9 9 9 8 9 1 14.50
42 30 11 8 12 14 8 8 3 14.00
43 17 10 10 10 10 9 9 1 12.00
44 35 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 3.75
45 37 5 0 4 3 0 0 5 3.25
46 41 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1.00
47 26 18 12 12 17 12 11 7 7.00
48 30 3 1 4 3 2 2 2 7.75
49 25 9 9 9 10 11 9 0 10.00
50 38 6 6 6 5 4 6 2 8.25
51 31 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 11.25
52 19 16 16 12 13 13 14 4 16.25
53 30 5 5 5 5 5 7 0 11.50
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Table 9: Incorrect Predictions, Individual Estimates, Repetition 3
Subject Repetition maximum average
Number RN EU DA PR RP RQ WU dierence inconsistency
1 37 3 3 1 3 2 3 2 4.25
2 33 10 7 5 7 6 10 5 8.50
3 31 6 6 7 5 5 4 2 9.00
4 18 12 12 11 13 10 7 5 8.00
5 33 10 8 9 8 7 9 3 9.00
6 15 13 14 11 11 11 14 2 12.75
7 40 6 6 5 6 6 6 1 10.25
8 20 19 19 18 18 16 15 4 14.75
9 30 10 10 10 11 11 11 0 12.25
10 25 6 6 6 7 6 5 1 9.50
11 36 7 7 6 2 0 2 7 4.75
12 35 5 3 5 5 2 4 3 3.75
13 12 8 9 4 7 4 6 4 13.25
14 27 12 12 8 13 10 8 4 11.50
15 20 11 10 13 13 11 5 6 11.25
16 30 6 3 5 8 4 3 3 10.50
17 19 13 13 13 7 12 6 7 15.25
18 24 8 6 8 6 8 8 2 10.00
19 25 15 14 10 13 9 6 9 13.25
20 34 14 9 12 9 12 21 5 22.75
21 16 11 11 14 13 12 12 0 13.25
22 20 11 12 11 10 12 13 1 7.75
23 20 13 8 9 13 10 9 5 10.50
24 30 9 7 9 9 7 10 2 14.00
25 23 16 15 19 19 17 15 1 20.75
26 13 15 16 15 8 15 17 7 15.75
27 16 16 16 18 15 18 14 2 16.75
28 36 13 10 13 11 11 12 3 7.00
29 32 7 6 6 8 6 6 1 8.50
30 26 13 13 10 12 9 11 4 9.00
31 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.75
32 35 5 5 5 2 3 5 3 4.75
33 31 8 6 6 6 4 4 4 7.75
34 6 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 3.25
35 33 5 2 5 5 3 2 3 9.75
36 32 4 4 2 2 2 4 2 5.75
37 38 8 3 7 8 4 3 5 9.50
38 28 7 6 7 7 7 8 1 15.25
39 20 8 8 5 11 6 7 3 6.25
40 24 10 10 6 5 6 9 5 8.00
41 15 13 12 13 13 12 12 1 14.50
42 19 11 11 8 9 8 9 3 14.00
43 22 6 6 8 5 7 6 1 12.00
44 35 6 2 4 1 1 2 5 3.75
45 38 4 0 3 4 0 0 4 3.25
46 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.00
47 26 18 18 15 22 13 10 8 7.00
48 35 7 6 7 7 6 8 1 7.75
49 30 7 7 6 7 6 7 1 10.00
50 34 3 3 4 3 3 5 0 8.25
51 27 6 6 3 2 3 5 4 11.25
52 22 13 14 11 13 12 13 2 16.25
53 31 8 8 5 7 7 6 3 11.50
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Table 10: Incorrect Predictions, Individual Estimates, Repetition
4
Subject Repetition maximum average
Number RN EU DA PR RP RQ WU dierence inconsistency
1 37 3 2 2 2 2 3 1 4.25
2 36 10 11 7 8 6 11 4 8.50
3 36 6 6 6 5 5 6 1 9.00
4 22 13 13 12 10 11 12 3 8.00
5 36 7 4 6 5 4 4 3 9.00
6 16 14 14 8 12 9 13 6 12.75
7 37 5 4 5 5 5 4 1 10.25
8 22 15 15 12 15 14 12 3 14.75
9 28 10 8 9 10 9 9 2 12.25
10 27 4 4 5 4 6 5 0 9.50
11 36 7 7 4 5 2 3 5 4.75
12 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.75
13 14 14 14 9 7 10 9 7 13.25
14 24 12 13 12 11 13 12 1 11.50
15 22 7 8 8 9 7 8 0 11.25
16 25 11 9 7 9 6 9 5 10.50
17 21 12 12 11 13 9 11 3 15.25
18 22 10 9 9 8 9 9 2 10.00
19 15 11 11 6 11 7 4 7 13.25
20 34 13 10 15 11 12 17 3 22.75
21 16 13 13 15 13 15 15 0 13.25
22 12 9 9 6 6 9 8 3 7.75
23 22 13 12 10 13 10 10 3 10.50
24 29 23 16 14 22 17 17 9 14.00
25 23 19 19 19 20 18 20 1 20.75
26 25 5 5 5 5 5 4 1 15.75
27 17 17 17 16 16 16 12 5 16.75
28 35 5 5 2 3 3 5 3 7.00
29 35 7 7 6 6 6 5 2 8.50
30 33 10 8 5 6 5 7 5 9.00
31 37 8 7 8 7 8 8 1 10.75
32 34 4 4 3 3 4 5 1 4.75
33 33 7 8 7 9 8 5 2 7.75
34 7 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3.25
35 30 9 9 9 9 10 6 3 9.75
36 34 2 2 1 2 0 2 2 5.75
37 39 9 8 4 8 6 7 5 9.50
38 30 10 9 10 11 9 10 1 15.25
39 19 5 5 3 7 4 3 2 6.25
40 28 13 13 10 9 11 10 4 8.00
41 16 16 16 14 16 14 16 2 14.50
42 26 11 8 16 14 10 4 7 14.00
43 25 11 9 10 12 11 11 2 12.00
44 36 6 6 5 3 2 6 4 3.75
45 40 2 2 3 2 3 2 0 3.25
46 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.00
47 26 20 16 15 19 15 10 10 7.00
48 33 5 4 4 3 4 5 2 7.75
49 29 6 6 5 4 5 4 2 10.00
50 34 13 10 9 17 8 14 5 8.25
51 23 8 8 7 9 8 8 1 11.25
52 20 15 12 10 12 8 10 7 16.25
53 33 14 14 12 10 13 9 5 11.50
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Table 11: Incorrect Predictions, Individual Estimates, Repetition
5
Subject Repetition maximum average
Number RN EU DA PR RP RQ WU dierence inconsistency
1 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.25
2 35 14 15 12 13 10 11 4 8.50
3 33 7 5 4 7 3 5 4 9.00
4 21 14 14 16 12 14 10 4 8.00
5 33 3 3 3 2 4 2 1 9.00
6 11 13 14 15 14 13 12 1 12.75
7 36 6 6 5 5 6 6 1 10.25
8 17 15 15 16 15 15 11 4 14.75
9 32 3 3 3 4 5 3 0 12.25
10 25 9 9 9 8 8 10 1 9.50
11 36 7 7 4 5 0 20 7 4.75
12 36 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 3.75
13 17 11 10 4 9 4 5 7 13.25
14 28 16 13 13 16 13 16 3 11.50
15 14 8 8 8 8 9 3 5 11.25
16 27 16 11 8 16 8 41 8 10.50
17 24 27 27 24 25 27 24 3 15.25
18 26 5 4 6 5 5 5 1 10.00
19 30 11 10 11 10 10 10 1 13.25
20 31 14 15 16 16 18 18 -1 22.75
21 17 7 6 7 6 7 7 1 13.25
22 16 10 8 9 8 7 7 3 7.75
23 18 7 7 5 6 6 8 2 10.50
24 27 15 14 13 16 16 11 4 14.00
25 30 7 7 6 7 7 7 1 20.75
26 31 11 11 11 8 10 10 3 15.75
27 10 18 18 12 18 15 11 7 16.75
28 31 7 8 8 6 5 3 4 7.00
29 33 6 6 5 5 3 4 3 8.50
30 30 11 9 8 11 7 10 4 9.00
31 32 4 3 4 4 4 4 1 10.75
32 35 6 6 6 3 4 6 3 4.75
33 29 11 8 6 11 7 7 5 7.75
34 6 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 3.25
35 31 11 10 8 10 9 7 4 9.75
36 35 2 2 4 2 2 3 0 5.75
37 40 13 7 10 13 5 11 8 9.50
38 31 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 15.25
39 21 5 7 4 7 6 5 1 6.25
40 26 8 8 5 6 5 9 3 8.00
41 17 6 7 6 5 5 3 3 14.50
42 27 10 6 10 9 9 6 4 14.00
43 29 8 8 7 8 7 6 2 12.00
44 37 7 3 8 4 2 3 5 3.75
45 41 3 3 2 3 3 3 1 3.25
46 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.00
47 24 16 15 12 20 13 11 5 7.00
48 35 5 3 6 7 5 7 2 7.75
49 27 3 3 0 3 0 3 3 10.00
50 39 14 12 9 14 1 18 13 8.25
51 27 7 7 5 5 6 6 2 11.25
52 16 14 13 11 15 10 13 4 16.25
53 25 8 8 8 4 8 6 4 11.50
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Table 12: Incorrect Predictions, Combined Estimates, Repetition
1
Subject Repetition maximum average
Number RN EU DA PR RP RQ WU dierence inconsistency
1 30 7 7 7 7 6 7 1 2.25
2 21 15 15 10 11 9 15 6 5.00
3 29 10 9 9 9 8 9 2 4.75
4 13 16 16 16 16 15 12 4 4.50
5 24 7 9 9 9 5 7 2 4.50
6 11 11 11 11 13 15 17 0 7.25
7 26 17 17 18 17 17 17 0 6.25
8 19 8 9 9 7 8 10 1 8.00
9 23 14 13 13 14 12 11 3 6.00
10 29 12 12 12 14 12 12 0 7.00
11 27 10 10 12 7 11 10 3 3.00
12 28 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 2.00
13 6 12 12 7 9 6 7 6 6.50
14 14 9 12 10 9 11 10 0 6.75
15 3 15 16 16 15 15 15 0 7.00
16 19 10 11 11 10 11 8 2 5.75
17 7 15 15 13 17 14 14 2 9.50
18 10 10 10 12 12 11 10 0 5.75
19 23 15 16 14 14 13 17 2 8.00
20 21 22 22 21 25 19 24 3 12.00
21 16 15 15 14 14 14 16 1 7.50
22 10 7 6 7 8 5 5 2 4.25
23 14 10 8 10 10 8 7 3 6.25
24 23 13 9 6 14 8 11 7 7.50
25 25 16 16 16 17 16 16 0 11.50
26 8 10 10 10 10 9 10 1 10.00
27 17 18 18 18 18 18 19 0 9.75
28 25 8 7 4 9 3 7 5 4.00
29 20 6 6 6 7 7 6 0 5.00
30 17 13 12 13 13 11 10 3 4.75
31 26 8 8 8 8 9 8 0 5.50
32 28 7 7 6 5 5 5 2 2.50
33 25 12 12 8 11 8 9 4 4.50
34 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1.50
35 31 6 6 6 6 6 6 0 5.75
36 25 11 10 11 10 11 10 1 4.50
37 26 17 15 8 8 8 15 9 5.50
38 28 14 14 14 15 15 13 1 7.75
39 15 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 4.50
40 18 13 13 7 11 8 9 6 4.25
41 10 16 16 15 16 18 16 1 7.50
42 28 21 18 21 16 18 17 5 7.75
43 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 6.50
44 30 7 7 6 4 4 6 3 2.25
45 29 12 10 11 10 9 17 3 2.75
46 33 4 2 4 2 2 13 2 0.75
47 19 13 10 10 16 10 10 3 3.75
48 16 16 17 16 16 16 17 0 5.50
49 17 16 15 16 16 16 17 1 5.75
50 32 9 9 10 10 8 10 1 4.50
51 25 10 10 9 10 9 9 1 5.50
52 13 12 12 13 13 13 13 0 9.00
53 23 13 13 14 12 14 12 1 6.25
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Table 13: Incorrect Predictions, Combined Estimates, Repetition
2
Subject Repetition maximum average
Number RN EU DA PR RP RQ WU dierence inconsistency
1 32 4 4 2 4 3 4 2 2.25
2 26 10 8 7 8 6 10 4 5.00
3 24 8 7 7 9 6 7 2 4.75
4 12 16 16 16 16 15 14 2 4.50
5 27 9 9 9 9 7 9 2 4.50
6 10 14 14 16 14 16 16 0 7.25
7 32 9 9 10 9 9 9 0 6.25
8 18 14 15 13 13 12 14 2 8.00
9 22 9 10 10 11 11 10 -1 6.00
10 19 12 12 12 10 12 10 2 7.00
11 27 5 5 5 4 4 5 1 3.00
12 30 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2.00
13 8 19 19 18 12 17 14 7 6.50
14 12 12 15 13 12 14 11 1 6.75
15 11 11 12 10 11 9 9 2 7.00
16 22 8 9 5 8 5 6 3 5.75
17 14 11 11 11 13 12 14 0 9.50
18 18 10 12 12 10 13 12 0 5.75
19 20 16 15 15 15 14 16 2 8.00
20 24 17 19 20 18 18 21 -1 12.00
21 10 10 10 9 11 9 9 1 7.50
22 10 10 9 10 9 8 10 2 4.25
23 12 7 5 7 7 5 4 3 6.25
24 21 10 8 11 11 7 6 4 7.50
25 23 16 16 18 17 18 14 2 11.50
26 7 16 16 16 12 15 16 4 10.00
27 11 12 12 12 14 12 13 0 9.75
28 27 5 4 3 6 0 4 5 4.00
29 21 7 7 5 6 6 7 2 5.00
30 19 16 11 10 16 8 11 8 4.75
31 21 9 9 9 9 10 9 0 5.50
32 27 7 7 4 3 5 5 4 2.50
33 21 10 12 8 9 8 9 2 4.50
34 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1.50
35 30 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 5.75
36 25 2 3 2 3 4 3 0 4.50
37 33 17 15 10 12 8 15 9 5.50
38 29 18 14 18 17 17 15 4 7.75
39 13 11 11 9 11 9 9 2 4.50
40 15 9 9 9 9 12 13 0 4.25
41 11 9 9 10 9 11 9 0 7.50
42 24 12 9 12 13 9 10 3 7.75
43 14 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 6.50
44 28 5 5 6 2 4 6 3 2.25
45 32 5 3 4 5 2 14 3 2.75
46 36 3 1 3 1 1 12 2 0.75
47 17 18 13 11 21 13 13 7 3.75
48 25 4 3 4 4 4 5 1 5.50
49 18 10 11 10 10 10 11 0 5.75
50 32 8 8 9 5 5 9 3 4.50
51 26 10 10 9 10 9 9 1 5.50
52 12 17 17 14 18 14 16 3 9.00
53 25 7 7 6 4 6 6 3 6.25
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Table 14: Incorrect Predictions, Combined Estimates, Repetition
3
Subject Repetition maximum average
Number RN EU DA PR RP RQ WU dierence inconsistency
1 32 3 3 1 3 2 3 2 2.25
2 26 9 9 8 9 7 9 2 5.00
3 26 7 6 8 6 5 6 2 4.75
4 10 10 10 10 10 11 8 2 4.50
5 27 9 7 9 7 7 9 2 4.50
6 8 13 13 9 11 11 11 4 7.25
7 33 6 8 7 8 6 6 0 6.25
8 16 20 21 17 17 18 16 4 8.00
9 25 11 10 10 11 11 10 1 6.00
10 21 8 8 8 8 8 6 2 7.00
11 29 6 6 6 3 5 6 3 3.00
12 29 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 2.00
13 6 10 10 7 9 8 9 3 6.50
14 18 13 12 12 13 11 12 2 6.75
15 15 13 12 14 13 15 9 4 7.00
16 25 9 6 10 9 10 7 3 5.75
17 14 13 13 13 7 12 8 6 9.50
18 20 8 10 10 8 11 8 0 5.75
19 18 14 11 9 13 10 10 5 8.00
20 31 13 9 16 12 12 13 4 12.00
21 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 0 7.50
22 12 12 13 12 9 12 12 3 4.25
23 11 11 7 9 11 7 10 4 6.25
24 25 12 10 15 11 13 14 2 7.50
25 17 19 17 19 16 17 17 3 11.50
26 8 13 13 13 13 14 15 0 10.00
27 11 16 16 16 18 16 13 3 9.75
28 29 12 11 8 13 7 11 5 4.00
29 26 9 9 7 6 6 9 3 5.00
30 21 11 10 11 11 11 10 1 4.75
31 33 5 5 5 5 6 5 0 5.50
32 28 5 5 4 3 5 5 2 2.50
33 24 5 7 5 6 5 6 0 4.50
34 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1.50
35 28 7 7 7 9 7 7 0 5.75
36 27 4 3 4 3 4 3 1 4.50
37 32 8 6 7 7 5 6 3 5.50
38 22 12 8 12 11 11 7 5 7.75
39 15 7 7 5 7 5 5 2 4.50
40 17 9 9 7 5 8 9 4 4.25
41 10 13 13 12 13 13 11 2 7.50
42 13 13 14 9 20 14 15 4 7.75
43 16 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 6.50
44 28 6 6 5 3 1 5 5 2.25
45 33 4 2 3 4 1 15 3 2.75
46 35 2 0 2 0 0 11 2 0.75
47 17 19 14 14 22 14 10 9 3.75
48 30 7 8 7 7 7 6 1 5.50
49 24 10 9 10 10 10 9 1 5.75
50 28 4 6 5 7 7 5 -1 4.50
51 21 5 5 6 5 6 6 0 5.50
52 14 15 15 8 14 8 12 7 9.00
53 26 10 10 9 7 9 7 3 6.25
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Table 15: Incorrect Predictions, Combined Estimates, Repetition
4
Subject Repetition maximum average
Number RN EU DA PR RP RQ WU dierence inconsistency
1 32 3 3 3 3 2 3 1 2.25
2 28 10 10 9 10 8 10 2 5.00
3 29 8 7 9 5 6 7 3 4.75
4 14 11 11 11 11 10 13 1 4.50
5 30 7 5 7 5 5 7 2 4.50
6 11 16 16 10 14 10 12 6 7.25
7 33 3 5 4 5 3 3 0 6.25
8 13 15 16 14 14 13 11 4 8.00
9 23 9 8 8 9 9 8 1 6.00
10 23 6 6 6 6 6 4 2 7.00
11 29 7 7 7 4 6 7 3 3.00
12 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.00
13 4 15 15 12 12 11 10 5 6.50
14 15 14 15 13 14 14 13 1 6.75
15 17 9 10 12 9 13 7 2 7.00
16 17 14 13 11 14 11 12 3 5.75
17 16 17 17 15 15 14 14 3 9.50
18 20 8 6 12 6 13 8 2 5.75
19 11 9 10 12 10 11 7 2 8.00
20 30 15 13 16 12 12 11 4 12.00
21 11 12 12 13 11 13 13 1 7.50
22 6 9 10 9 8 9 11 1 4.25
23 11 12 12 10 12 8 11 4 6.25
24 20 24 20 17 25 19 22 7 7.50
25 21 20 18 20 19 20 18 2 11.50
26 18 8 8 8 8 9 8 0 10.00
27 13 17 17 17 19 17 14 3 9.75
28 29 5 4 3 6 4 4 2 4.00
29 30 9 9 9 10 10 9 0 5.00
30 26 10 7 8 10 8 11 3 4.75
31 30 8 8 8 8 9 8 0 5.50
32 27 4 4 3 2 4 4 2 2.50
33 27 7 7 9 8 9 6 1 4.50
34 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1.50
35 25 10 10 10 12 10 10 0 5.75
36 29 3 2 3 2 3 2 1 4.50
37 33 11 9 6 8 6 9 5 5.50
38 24 10 10 10 11 11 11 0 7.75
39 14 6 6 4 6 4 4 2 4.50
40 21 11 11 11 9 12 11 2 4.25
41 12 16 16 15 16 16 12 4 7.50
42 21 11 8 15 12 10 5 6 7.75
43 18 12 12 12 12 12 12 0 6.50
44 29 6 6 5 3 3 5 3 2.25
45 34 4 2 3 4 3 15 2 2.75
46 35 2 0 2 0 0 11 2 0.75
47 15 18 15 15 21 15 11 7 3.75
48 28 5 6 5 5 5 4 1 5.50
49 22 6 7 6 6 6 5 1 5.75
50 27 13 11 12 16 10 14 3 4.50
51 18 9 9 10 9 10 10 0 5.50
52 14 15 15 10 14 10 12 5 9.00
53 26 14 14 13 11 13 11 3 6.25
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Table 16: Incorrect Predictions, Combined Estimates, Repetition
5
Subject Repetition maximum average
Number RN EU DA PR RP RQ WU dierence inconsistency
1 33 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2.25
2 28 11 11 10 11 9 11 2 5.00
3 26 6 5 7 5 4 5 2 4.75
4 14 12 12 12 12 13 12 0 4.50
5 28 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 4.50
6 6 12 12 16 12 14 16 0 7.25
7 32 6 4 7 4 6 6 2 6.25
8 12 17 18 14 14 15 15 3 8.00
9 27 5 4 4 5 5 6 1 6.00
10 20 10 10 10 10 10 8 2 7.00
11 29 7 7 7 4 6 7 3 3.00
12 30 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2.00
13 10 15 15 12 12 11 14 4 6.50
14 19 17 16 14 17 15 18 3 6.75
15 10 8 9 9 8 10 4 4 7.00
16 20 16 15 9 16 9 12 7 5.75
17 18 22 22 20 24 21 21 2 9.50
18 21 4 6 8 6 9 6 -2 5.75
19 24 14 13 13 13 12 16 2 8.00
20 25 15 15 18 16 16 17 0 12.00
21 11 6 6 7 7 7 7 0 7.50
22 10 10 11 10 9 10 8 2 4.25
23 13 8 8 8 8 8 7 1 6.25
24 19 15 13 14 18 16 15 2 7.50
25 26 15 13 13 12 13 13 3 11.50
26 25 17 17 17 19 16 15 2 10.00
27 8 19 19 19 19 19 14 5 9.75
28 25 6 5 8 7 5 5 1 4.00
29 28 8 8 8 7 7 8 1 5.00
30 23 11 8 9 11 9 12 3 4.75
31 28 5 5 5 5 4 5 1 5.50
32 28 6 6 5 6 6 6 1 2.50
33 24 9 9 7 10 7 8 2 4.50
34 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1.50
35 25 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 5.75
36 30 6 5 6 5 4 5 2 4.50
37 32 13 11 8 10 8 13 5 5.50
38 26 7 5 7 6 6 6 2 7.75
39 16 6 6 4 6 4 4 2 4.50
40 19 9 9 5 7 6 7 4 4.25
41 12 8 8 7 8 8 4 4 7.50
42 20 11 12 15 14 14 9 2 7.75
43 24 6 6 6 6 6 6 0 6.50
44 30 8 8 7 5 3 7 5 2.25
45 36 3 1 2 3 2 16 2 2.75
46 35 2 0 2 0 0 11 2 0.75
47 14 19 16 12 22 16 10 9 3.75
48 30 7 8 7 7 7 6 1 5.50
49 22 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 5.75
50 31 14 12 11 13 5 13 9 4.50
51 21 7 7 8 7 8 8 0 5.50
52 9 13 13 12 14 12 12 1 9.00
53 19 9 9 10 10 10 10 0 6.25
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